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RECENT DECISIONS
these would be factors for consideration in determining the amount
of recovery. One writer has, in fact, insisted that the courts would
not be making a radical departure if they recognized a cause of
action for wrongful birth:
The most incisive objections to recognition of the cause of
action are based upon public policy and the historical judicial
reluctance to impose a duty where nonfeasance is concerned.
These objections, however, do not necessarily compel the conclu-
sion that legislative action alone would permit courts to recog-
nize the claim. Without great deviation from precedent, courts
could let the bastard recover."
Despite such views, a legal remedy for the illegitimate must await
future developments. For the present, Slawek has determined that
illegitimacy is a wrong for which there is no relief.
The court's decision in Slawek and the legislature's response to
it,31 bring Wisconsin into line with the rulings of the United States
Supreme Court on a putative father's assertion of parental rights.
The possible effects that Slawek will have on custody proceedings
remain to be seen. The necessity for an unwed mother to reveal the
father's identity in order that notice may be given him will proba-
bly be challenged as a violation of the consitutional right to privacy
as was asserted in Griswold v. Connecticut.3 In such a case, the
father's right to notice and a hearing, the mother's right to privacy
and the child's best interests must be balanced and, if the court
continues to move in the direction it has taken in Slawek, the
mother's right to privacy will surely be outweighed.
MARY PAT KOESTERER
Use of a Juvenile's Confession While Under Exclusive Jurisdiction
of the Juvenile Court in a Subsequent Criminal Proceeding-In
State v. Loyd' four youths gained entrance to the home of two
elderly women whom they assaulted and robbed. A Minneapolis
Police Department school liaison officer was assigned to investi-
34. R. Thomas Farrar, Does the Bastard Have a Legitimate Complaint?, 22 MIAMI L.
REV. 884, 905 (Summer, 1968).
35. See footnote 14, supra.
36. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1. - Minn. -, 212 N.W.2d 671 (1973).
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gate this and other robberies which had occurred in the area. Stan-
ley Loyd was known to the liaison officer because Loyd was on
juvenile parole and because the officer had previously agreed to
assist him in obtaining a job. Based on information obtained by
the officer a warrant was secured for Loyd's arrest. Upon learning
Loyd was wanted for questioning, his parents accompanied him to
the courthouse where he was informed that he was suspected of
committing the robbery. He was given a standard Miranda warn-
ing but was not informed that he might be prosecuted as an adult.
Both the defendant and his parents acknowledged that they under-
stood his rights. Defendant admitted involvement in the robbery.
Later, after another Miranda warning and waiver of rights, defen-
dant signed a statement to this effect.
In April of 1971, the Hennepin County Juvenile Court waived
its jurisdiction over the defendant and referred him for prosecution
as an adult pursuant to Minnesota Statute section 260.125 (1971).
Loyd was tried and found guilty of aggravated robbery. His convic-
tion was appealed on the basis that his confession, which was given
while he was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court,
should not have been admitted as evidence in a criminal proceed-
ing. The foundation for this contention was Minnesota Statute
section 260.211(1) (1971), pertinent portions of which read, "...
the disposition of the child or any evidence given by the child in
the juvenile court shall not be admissable as evidence against him
in any case or proceeding in any other court. . ....
Prior to this decision, other jurisdictions had established four
basic modes of dealing with confessions of juveniles made prior to
their referral to criminal court. The District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals in Harling v. United States2 stated:
It would offend these principles [of fundamental fairness] to
allow admissions made by the child in the non-criminal and non-
punitive setting of juvenile proceedings to be used later for the
purpose of securing his criminal conviction and punishment?
The court held that "admissions by a juvenile in connection with
the non-criminal proceeding be excluded from evidence in the
criminal proceeding."4 The court relied upon language in Pee v.
United States5 which indicated that a minor who has committed a
2. 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
3. Id. at 163.
4. Id. at 164.
5. 274 F.2d 556, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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criminal offense is exempt from the criminal law unless and until
the juvenile court waives its jurisdiction. Relying upon principles
of fundamental fairness, it would be a breach of faith, the court
reasoned, to allow pre-referral confessions to be admitted in a
criminal proceeding. This breach would arise were the child to be
charged with: (1) knowledge of his privilege against self-
incrimination, and (2) knowledge of the juvenile court's power to
waive its jurisdiction and subject him to criminal penalties.'
The court also reasoned that if admissions made prior to waiver
of jurisdiction by the juvenile court were admitted in a criminal
proceeding, this would violate the parens patriae7 function of the
juvenile court in that the juvenile proceedings would be made to
serve as an adjunct to and part of the criminal process. This could
not be allowed since it would intrude upon the non-criminal philos-
ophy of the juvenile court.8 The juvenile court has never been
equated with a criminal court. It has always been viewed as a civil
forum: its dispositions are civil, indeterminate, and aimed at the
treatment and rehabilitation of the child.?
Although the court did not cite the D.C. Code Annotated,
section 11-915 (1961), as a basis for its decision, it should be noted
that the language of this statute is virtually the same as that of
Minnesota Statute section 260.211(1) (1971). ° It should also be
noted that the Harling decision was prior to In re Gault" which
required that due process of law be applied in adjudicating the
delinquency of a minor if this decision could lead to commitment
in a state institution. Thus, since post Gault delinquency adjudica-
tions must apply stricter standards than those prior to Gault, one
might assume that more stringent requirements for pre-referral
confessions would also be applied. Rather than this being the case
the post Gault decisions have applied a less rigorous standard for
admission of the pre-referral confession in subsequent criminal
proceedings . 2
6. Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
7. Parens patriae, meaning father or parent of his country, refers to the duty a govern-
ment has to protect, control and guard the interests of minor children. 46 MINN. L. REV.
967, 968 (1962).
8. Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
9. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).
10. "The disposition of a child or any evidence given in the court shall not be admissable
as evidence against the child in any case or proceeding in any other court. . . ." June 12,
1952, 66 Stat. 134, Ch. 417, § 2. Revised and re-enacted by act December 23, 1963, Public
Law 88-241, 77 Stat. 478, effective January 1, 1964.
11. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
12. Of the cases discussed, Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961),
1974]
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A second method of dealing with confessions of juveniles prior
to their being referred to criminal court was developed by the
Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Maloney. 3 Chief Justice Bern-
stein, writing for the court, relied heavily upon the Harling decision
but came to a different conclusion. As has been noted, Harling held
that admissions by a juvenile in connection with the non-criminal
proceeding of the juvenile court be excluded from evidence in a
criminal proceeding. The Arizona court held that the due process
demands of fundamental fairness would be satisfied if "he and his
parents are advised before questioning not only of the child's right
to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination, but also of the
possibility that he may be remanded to be tried as an adult."14
(Emphasis added.) Thus, procedural steps were established which
would allow the admission of pre-referral confessions into evi-
dence.
Chief Justice Bernstein discussed the role of the juvenile court
in light of Arizona Revised Statute section 8-228 (1965), subsection
B, which also is substantially identical with the Minnesota and
District of Columbia Statutes." Justice Bernstein determined that
and State v. Gullings, 244 Or. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966), pre-date In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967). State v. Maloney, 102 Ariz. 495, 433 P.2d 625 (1967); O'Neil v. State, 2 Tn. Cr.
518, 455 S.W.2d 597 (1970); and State v. Loyd, - Minn. - , 212 N.W.2d 671 (1973)
are subsequent decisions. Whether they were pre or post Gault, supra., seems to have had
little to do with the test they employed concerning statements of the juvenile made prior to
juvenile court waiver of jurisdiction.
13. 102 Ariz. 495, 433 P.2d 625 (1967).
14. State v. Maloney, 102 Ariz. 445, -, 433 P.2d 625, 629 (1967).
15. At the time of the decision the statute read: "The disposition of a child or of
evidence given in the juvenile court shall not be admissable as evidence against the child in
any proceeding in another court..." Since the decision it has been repealed. Arizona Laws
1970, Chapter 223 §1, effective August 11, 1970. Presently ARIz. REV. STAT. § 8-207(c)
(1971) reads: "The disposition of a child in the juvenile court may not be used against the
child in any case or proceeding in any court other than a juvenile court. ... Whether
this repeal and enactment of the subsequent statute which did not direct itself to evidence
given in the juvenile court, but only to the disposition of a child in the juvenile court was a
legislative attempt to limit Maloney and cases which subsequently followed it is unclear.
But the Arizona court in State v. Hardy, 107 Ariz. 583, _ ,491 P.2d 17, 18 (1971) stated:
The presence of the child's parents or their consent to a waiver of rights is only one
of the elements to be considered by the trial court in determining that the Statement
was voluntary and the child intelligently comprehended his rights. To the extent that
this position deviates from State v. Maloney, supra that decision is overruled.
This overruling of Maloney came after the statute change and it would have been difficult
to give as expansive a reading to the new statute, which only stated that the disposition of
a child in the juvenile court would not be used in another court. The Minnesota statute dealt
with the disposition of the child or any evidence given by him. Thus, the overruled Maloney
decision was still pertinent to any decision made by the Minnesota court.
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the scope of the statute included more than evidence which was
presented in the courtroom.
[A]n inculpatory statement obtained by the police while the child
is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is part of the evi-
dence gathering function of that court. The fact that such evi-
dence was never offered to the juvenile court in a hearing to
adjudicate whether the child is delinquent does not alter the fact
that such an inculpatory statement is evidence."6
This interpretation of "evidence given in juvenile court" includes
more than evidence presented in a court adjudication. The inad-
missable evidence extends to any and all evidence which has been
obtained while the child was within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court.
A third approach was adopted by the Supreme Court of Ore-
gon in State v. Gullings.17 The court rejected the absolute
prohibition of pre-referral confessions and set up standards by
which admissions of juveniles could be admitted in a criminal pro-
ceeding. Gullings required only that it be made clear to the juvenile
that criminal responsibility could result and that the questioning
authorities were not operating as his friends but as his adver-
saries." A prime consideration in determining that Gullings was
aware of the adversary setting was the fact that the arresting officer
was cognizant of the possibility the youth might later be charged
in criminal court, and therefore the officer was specific in inform-
ing the defendant of possible consequences. The difference between
the Arizona and Oregon tests is that in Maloney the Arizona court
made it clear that a juvenile and his parents must be warned of a
possible criminal charge prior to the juvenile's making any state-
ment, while in Oregon a court does an after-the-fact examination
of the facts and circumstances and then determines if the juvenile
was aware some form of punishment could result. Although the
warning given by the Oregon police officer in Gullings would meet
the Arizona court test, such warning is not required by the Oregon
court.
A second significant difference between the Arizona and Ore-
gon courts is the narrower interpretation the Oregon court places
upon the statutory language, "evidence given by the child in the
juvenile court." While Arizona had concluded that this meant all
16. State v. Maloney, 102 Ariz. 445, -, 433 P.2d 625, 628 (1967).
17. 244 Or. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966).
1974]
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evidence gathered while the youth was under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court, the Oregon court reasoned that this language did
not extend to information obtained through investigatory activities
of the police. This was because the statute ought to promote the
parens patriae relationship between the juvenile court and the
child, and not between the police and the child. 9
The fourth and last approach taken in dealing with confessions
made prior to the referral to criminal court is that taken by the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals in O'Neil v. State."° The
court concluded that the mandate of In re Gault, which required
that there be clear and unequivocal evidence that an admission of
a juvenile was made with knowledge that he was not obliged to
speak and would not be penalized for remaining silent,2 1 was satis-
fied if a proper Miranda warning were given."2 Of the four methods
chosen by courts to deal with pre-referral confessions make by
juveniles the approach of the Tennessee court demands the least
rigorous safeguards for protection of the juvenile. The District of
Columbia court refused to allow any pre-referral evidence into a
later criminal trial. The Arizona court in Maloney required the
protection afforded by Gault plus an additional warning to the
youth and his parents that any statements made could later be used
in a criminal proceeding. The Oregon court requires the Gault
protection plus a showing that the youth was aware that some form
of punishment could occur. The Tennessee court concluded that
after the Miranda warning has been given the protection required
by Gault has been afforded and no more is needed.
The Minnesota court had the option of choosing one of these
four approaches, which ranged from complete exclusion of confes-
sions made prior to referral to criminal court to the mere require-
ment that a Miranda warning be given to the youth. The
Minnesota court chose the Oregon method of dealing with pre-
referral confessions.
A confession by a juvenile is admissable if he has been apprised
of his constitutional rights and voluntarily and intelligently
waives those rights in making statement. . . .While all of the
18. Id. at __ ,416 P.2d 313.
19. Id. at ._ ,416 P.2d 315.
20. 2 Tn. Cr. 518, 455 S.W.2d 597 (1970).
21. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
22. Accord, State v. Francois, 197 So. 2d 492 (1967), cert. denied, Walker v. Florida,
390 U.S. 982 (1968).
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facts and circumstances should be examined in determining
whether a juvenile has intelligently waived those rights, it is im-
portant that the juvenile is questioned in an adversary setting and
not in the confidential atmosphere of the juvenile court process;
otherwise he may not realize that criminal responsibility may
result.?
The choice made by the Minnesota court seems poor for two
reasons. First, of the four possible options, the Minnesota court
chose the one which is most ambiguous when attempting to ascer-
tain if the requirements of the law have been met in order to have
pre-referral confessions admitted as evidence in criminal court.
The standards adopted by the court required that the juvenile must
be advised of his constitutional rights and voluntarily and intelli-
gently waive those rights. If this were all that was needed, a
Miranda warning and waiver would satisfy the requirements. But
the court indicated it was following the Oregon court, not the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, which only required the
Miranda warning. The Oregon court required something over and
above this: a showing of awareness of adversity on the part of the
juvenile. The Minnesota court stated it is important that the juve-
nile is questioned in an adversary setting and not in the confidential
atmosphere of the juvenile court process. In dicta the court ob-
served that the safest way of showing adversity is to advise the
suspect that criminal prosecution may result.24 This language sug-
gests that this warning is not mandatory. Since this advice is not
required, the ambiguity arises. How does one establish that the
juvenile was aware he was being questioned in an adversary setting
and not in the confidential atmosphere of the juvenile court?
Whether the matter is adjudicated within the civil confines of the
juvenile court or prosecuted in criminal court, the same people will
have pursued the investigation and questioned the youth. Only the
seriousness of the offense may indicate to a television-seasoned
generation of youth that there is a possibility that the case may end
up in criminal court. The second or third time youthful offender,
when compared to the first time offender, is at a disadvantage
under these circumstances. The repeater knows how the system
worked in the past and has every reason to believe it will continue
to work in the same way. In the past, he was encouraged to give
all pertinent information to the authorities so they could help him.
23. State v. Loyd, - Minn. , 212 N.W.2d 671, 677 (1973).
24. Id.
1974]
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The theory of the juvenile system was that he was not to be pun-
ished but assisted. In this way he could avoid the same mistake in
the future. The same people who sought information in order to
assist him in avoiding future mistakes will now be seeking the same
type of information in order to convict him of a crime. In the
instant case Stanley Loyd was questioned by a police officer whom
he knew and who had promised to help Loyd in obtaining a job.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, concurring with the trial court,
found that there was a showing of adversity when Loyd was ques-
tioned. It seems clear that both courts could have logically found
that Loyd felt he was in the confidential atmosphere of the juvenile
court. A test which offers no clearer guidelines than this is a poor
test. It is safe to predict that in the future Minnesota police forces,
attorneys, trial judges and the Supreme Court will be wrestling
with the conceptual boundaries of adversity and the issue of
whether the particular youthful suspect comprehended his presence
in an adversary setting. 5
The second weakness of the Minnesota decision is that the
youth who has committed a crime will suffer. The juvenile court
system was established:
. . . [B]ecause every legislature in the country has seen fit to
institutionalize the societal consensus that children who run afoul
of the law should be treated differently than adults and given an
opportunity to be helped and rehabilitated rather than aban-
doned to the retributive social machinery of the adult criminal
justice system.2 1
If there is a commitment to this philosophy, it should be made
clear to a youthful suspect that it is possible he will be treated as
an adult and a criminal, not as a youth.
In requiring that a youth be advised of the possibility of crimi-
nal prosecution from the outset, the Arizona court in Maloney
avoided the difficulty of determining whether he was aware he was
in an adversary setting or that punishment might follow. The
Maloney decision also offered a youth more protection than the
Tennessee court which required no more than a Miranda warning
because in Maloney the youth and his parents had to be advised
that criminal proceedings could follow. Maloney also avoided the
pitfalls of the Harling decision, which would never allow evidence
25. State v. O'Neil, - Minn. _, 216 N.W.2d 822 (1974).
26. Stamm, Transfer of Jurisdiction in Juvenile Court, 62 Ky. L. J. 122, 124 (1973).
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obtained while the juvenile was under the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court to be later used in a criminal trial.
For the above mentioned reasons, the Arizona approach in
Maloney is to be preferred over that of the Minnesota court in
Loyd. When this question presents itself in other jurisdictions,
Maloney is the precedent which should be followed.27
GREGORY M. WEYANDT
Landlord and Tenant Law-The Implied Warranty of Habitability
in Residential Leases-The recent case of Green v. Sumskil arose
when landlord Jack Sumski, seeking possession of leased premises
and back rent, commenced an unlawful detainer action in the San
Francisco Small Claims Court. The tenant admitted nonpayment
of rent and defended the action on the ground that the landlord
failed to maintain the premises in a habitable condition. The small
claims court awarded the landlord possession of the premises and
entered a money judgment for back rent against the tenant. The
tenant appealed to the San Francisco Superior Court and a de
novo trial was held. The tenant submitted a copy of an inspection
report of the San Francisco Department of Public Works disclos-
ing about eighty housing code violations in the building as well as
an order of the department scheduling a condemnation hearing.
The tenant also submitted a detailed list of serious defects2 which
had not been repaired by the landlord after notice. The landlord
27. As yet, Wisconsin has not been faced with this problem. Wis. STAT. § 48.38(1)
(1971), states:
• . . The disposition of any child's case or any evidence given in the juvenile court
shall not be admissable as evidence against the child in any case or proceeding in
any other court ...
In Banas v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 468, 473, 149 N.W.2d 571, 574 (1966), the court stated:
• * . Under the prohibitions of sec. 48.38(1) the disposition of the child's case and
any evidence given in the juvenile court are not admissable as evidence against the
child in any case or proceeding in any other court.
This statement was made with reference to the refusal to allow a juvenile adjudication to
be used to impeach a juvenile witness. Whether it would apply in the same manner in a
Loyd fact situation and what is meant by "evidence given in the juvenile court" remains to
be seen.
1. Green v. Sumski, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
2. The supreme court listed some of the more serious defects described by the tenant
including (I) the collapse and non-repair of the bathroom ceiling, (2) the continued presence
of rats, mice, and cock-roaches on the premises, (3) the lack of any heat in four of the
apartment's rooms, (4) plumbing blockages, (5) exposed and faulty wiring, and (6) an
illegally installed and dangerous stove. Id. at 621, 517 P.2d at 1170, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
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